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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
A pipeline now sits in place of an earthen ditch crossing the property of Daryl and 
Linda Mullinix (Mullinix). That ditch had been utilized by both parties' predecessors in 
interest to convey water from Joe Creek, a tributary to the Salmon River, to irrigate 
property owned by both Appellant and Respondent. This case involves Mullinix's right 
to use the pipeline that crosses their property to convey water from Joe Creek to irrigate 
their property as authorized by their water right. The District Court held that Mullinix 
had that right, with certain conditions. Appellant (Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co.)1 
now seeks to have this Court override the findings and conclusions of the district court 
and to evict Mullinix from any use of the pipeline that crosses Mullinix's land. 
This case involves the second legal dispute between Mullinix and Killgore over 
the use of water from Joe Creek on their respective properties. R. 170-1711125-30. The 
first act played out in the SRBA Court. There, Killgore repeatedly challenged Mullinix's 
efforts to obtain a water right from both Joe Creek and from the Salmon River for their 
20.1 acre parcel on the Salmon River bank. As Killgore admits, it asserted in the SRBA 
proceedings that Mullinix' s water rights had been lost by virtue of forfeiture. Killgore 
Briefp. 1; Tr., p. 152, LL 1-3. 
Historically, water was delivered from Joe Creek to Mullinix's property by a ditch 
following the same route as the current pipeline. Tr., p. 150, L 5, p. 308, L. 4; Ex. 15. 
1 The correct legal name of the Appellant is Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co. (See Ex. 6). In its Appellate 
Brief, Appellant refers to itself as Killgore Salmon River Fruit Company (Appellant's Brief, p. 1) and 
Killgore (without the 's). Because of the confusion generated by referring to the possessive of the name 
Killgore's as the short-hand for the full company name, Mullinix will adopt the convention ofreferring to 
Appellant "Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co." as Killgore. In doing so, Mullinix does not waive any rights 
in the judgment as against the proper Defendant, Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 1 
There is no other practical way to get water from Joe Creek to Mullinix's property except 
by way of this ditch. Tr., p. 307, LL. 18-25. 
Ultimately, and importantly for this proceeding, Mullinix was decreed a water 
right from Joe Creek in the SRBA proceedings. R. 226, Ex. 30. Given the facts that the 
ditch carried water to the Mullinix property along the same route as the current pipeline 
and that Mullinix has a water right to divert water from Joe Creek for use on their 
property, the district court correctly held that Mullinix retains the right to use the ditch 
and pipeline. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
The proceedings in this case were initiated to establish Mullinix's right to use the 
ditch and pipeline to deliver water, as authorized by their decreed water rights. This 
second case was filed because the parties did not resolve as between themselves the use 
of the pipeline and ditch right-of-way and because the SRBA court, as a court oflimited 
jurisdiction, lacked the authority to decree the parties' interest in the pipeline. See Bedke 
v. Pickett Ranch & Sheep Co., 143 Idaho 36, 137 P.3d 423 (2006) (district court 
proceeding to determine right to use pipeline). 
Mullinix sought relief by way of its complaint ( 1) for a declaratory judgment that 
Mullinix had the right to use the pipeline, (2) for injunctive relief preventing Killgore and 
its agents from interfering with Mullinix use of the pipeline and (3) for tortious injury to 
Mullinix's property caused by Killgore's intentional destruction of the Mullinix 
connection to the pipeline. R. 15-19. By Amended Complaint, Mullinix added a count 
requiring Killgore to furnish water under Idaho Code§ 42-912, consistent with prior 
requests from Mullinix. R. 100-101; Tr., p. 297 LL. 4-8; Exs. 39, 42; R. 230, ,r 9. 
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Killgore counterclaimed, asserting that (1) it was entitled to an easement crossing 
Mullinix's property for the pipeline, (2) Mullinix allegedly breached the prior settlement 
agreement in the SRBA proceedings, (3) Mullinix converted Killgore's water right and 
easement by using the pipeline, (4) Mullinix interfered with Killgore's easement and 
water rights, and (5) seeking an injunction preventing Mullinix from having access to the 
pipeline. R. 123-133. 
Cross motions for summary judgment were filed and denied by the Court on April 
3, 2013. R. 6. A court trial was held on May 29, 30 and 31, 2014. Prior to trial, the 
parties agreed upon stipulated facts which were submitted to the Court. R. 166. 
Evidence was presented on May 29th and 30th• Upon the close of evidence on the 30th, 
the Court conducted a site visit in presence of counsel and walked the entire length of the 
pipeline from the Mullinix property to the diversion structure on Joe Creek. 
On May 31, 2013, following the conclusion of the evidence, the court heard 
closing arguments via telephone. The district court then proceeded and "orally 
pronounced its findings to the parties on the Court's conclusions and offered the parties 
the opportunity to work out a mutually agreeable solution." R. 227-228. The district court 
specifically found that Mullinix had an interest to utilize the conveyance system. The 
Court also determined that Killgore had no legal basis to prevent Mullinix from using the 
pipeline. The Court determined that the most "sensible" solution was to place a second 
"bubbler" on Joe Creek for Mullinix to divert water into the pipeline. As the location of 
that second bubbler would have to be on a third party's property, Robinson, the court was 
concerned that it lacked the power to require Robinson, who was not a party, to grant an 
easement for that purpose. 
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At the close of the case, the court also held that both parties had proven their 
damages claims against one another in an amount that entirely offset the other's damage 
claims. Tr., p. 80, LL. 7-14 (May 31, 2013). The court rejected Killgore's claim for 
injunctive relief. Id. 
The Court then gave the parties the opportunity to procure the most "sensible" 
result (and arguably most beneficial and least intrusive to Killgore) whereby Mullinix 
would install a second bubbler system below Killgore's point of diversion to divert 
Mullinix's water into the pipe. Id. 
A status conference hearing was set for July 08, 2013. At that hearing, counsel for 
Mullinix advised the court that Robinsons were willing to enter into an easement 
agreement for Mullinix to install a second bubbler, however Robinsons were reluctant 
because they feared potential liability asserted against them by Killgore if they granted an 
easement to construct the bubbler. Tr., p. 8, L. 14, p. 9, L. 7 (July 8, 2013). 
Killgore was unwilling to release Robinson from liability associated with 
Robinson's granting Mullinix an easement to implement the court's "sensible solution" 
of a second bubbler. Id. The court again concluded that this second bubbler was "the 
most intelligent way to deal with the issue." Id. p. 11, L. 11. 
The court, in an exercise of its equitable powers, concluded that if Killgore 
continued to interfere with the court's preferred solution of installing the second bubbler, 
by preventing or failing to cooperate with Mullinix in his attempt to obtain an easement 
from Robinson, then the court would have to find another alternative to the preferred and 
"more intelligent" solution. Id. p. 12, L. 1, p. 13, L. 22. The court then offered Killgore 
the option of working with Mullinix and Robinson so that Mullinix could obtain the 
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necessary permission from Robinson to install the second diversion and bubbler, or the 
court would have to consider other more drastic options. Id. p. 13. 
The court set a status conference for August 5, 2013, giving the parties time to 
cooperate in procuring the easement from the Robinsons. At the August 5, 2013 status 
conference, Mullinix had to report to the court that an easement still had not been granted 
by Robinson because Killgore steadfastly refused to cooperate in advising Robinson that 
Robinson would not face liability to Killgore if Robinson granted an easement in 
accordance with the court's rulings. Tr., p. 23, LL. 1-9 (Aug. 5, 2013). Therefore, 
Mullinix was unable to procure an easement from Robinson. Id. The best that Killgore 
would say is that they had not yet threatened Robinson with litigation. Id. But Killgore 
still would not advise Robinsons that they could help implement the court's order by 
granting an easement to Mullinix for the bubbler. Id. 
Since an easement for the bubbler from Robinson could not be procured without 
Killgore's cooperation, the district court issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and a separate Decree on September 23, 2013. R. 221,233. The court's Findings of 
Fact incorporated the parties stipulated facts and the court added additional findings 
based on the trial testimony. R. 221. The district court's Decree is summarized in 
pertinent part as follows: 
1. As against Killgore, Mullinix shall have the right and authority to 
divert water from the pipeline at a location on the Mullinix parcel of 
Mullinix's choosing to deliver 0.4 cubic feet per second to irrigate the 
Mullinix parcel. Mullinix's right to 0.4 cubic feet per second of water is 
inferior to Killgore's right to 2.2 cubic feet per second of water. Should 
the flow of water in the pipeline decrease to less than 2.6 cubic feet per 
second, Mullinix's right will decline proportionally. Installation of a 
second point of diversion and bubbler on Ernie Robinson's property by 
Mullinix is subject to Mullinix obtaining Robinson's consent or 
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demonstrating such other legal authority for such installation as may be 
necessary. 
2. In the event Mullinix installs a separate diversion into Killgore's 
pipeline as indicated above, each party shall install a measuring device on 
their own diversion which meets the requirements of the Idaho 
Department of Water Resources. 
3. Mullinix shall have the right to install the tap/valve at a location 
selected by Mullinix on the Mullinix parcel capable of delivery 0.4 cubic 
feet per second to the Mullinix parcel. Installation of the tap/valve shall be 
constructed at Mullinix's expense. Annual delivery charges to the 
Mullinix parcel shall be $100 per year payable at the beginning of the 
irrigation season. This fee is based on the annual fee charged by Killgore 
to Killgore's Horseshoe Bend Estate Subdivision lots owners as set forth 
in the irrigation agreements between Killgore and the subdivision lot 
owners. IfKillgore's fee to Killgore's Horseshoe Bend Estate Subdivision 
increases, Mullinix's fee shall be increased correspondingly. 
4. The Decree requires Mullinix and Killgore to take action or refrain 
from taking action in the future ... Accordingly, this court retains 
jurisdiction to ensure that the terms of the decree are carried out. 
5. Killgore is awarded an easement to maintain its pipeline as it 
traverses Mullinix' s property ... The easement is to provide Killgore the 
right to maintain its pipeline on Mullinix's property. 
R. 233-235. 
With respect to Killgore' s claim to an easement crossing Mullinix' s property, the 
court found that Killgore was entitled to an easement for the existing pipeline. The court 
ordered Killgore to obtain a survey of the location of the easement, as requested by 
Mullinix R. 235. Because the pipe was buried, Mullinix could not locate the pipe with 
any degree of certainty. Tr., p. 262, L. 9, p. 263, L. 25. Mr. Mullinix asked Killgore to 
locate the pipe, but Carl Killgore said he could not and would not do so. Tr., p. 227, 
LL. 1-7. Mullinix did not oppose recognition of the easement across his property, but 
asked the court to order a survey as a condition of the easement, so Mullinix would know 
where the pipe was located. Tr., p. 148, LL. 11-14. After trial, Killgore submitted two 
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versions of a survey before an acceptable and complete version was provided. R. 185, 
199. Ultimately, the court's Decree and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
recognized the easement as surveyed and required Killgore to monument the beginning 
and end points. R. 235. 
Following the issuance of the court's Decree and Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Mullinix filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking clarification 
and modification of the Decree and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on two 
points. R. 239. The first clarification sought to have the court modify the decree and 
findings to recognize that in the event Killgore was not putting its full Joe Creek water 
right to beneficial use, then Mullinix could use that water when Killgore was not. R. 240. 
There was some danger of confusion in the court's language that Killgore would assert 
that Mullinix could not use Joe Creek water regardless of what Killgore was actually 
using. Id. This fear has proven to be well-founded.2 The second basis for 
reconsideration involved clarification of the application ofidaho Code§ 42-912 to 
Mullinix's right to use water from the pipeline. R. 241. Mullinix also filed a cost bill, 
seeking costs and fees. R. 263. Killgore objected. R. 264. 
On October 28, 2013, the court held a hearing on the motion for reconsideration 
and objection to costs. At the hearing, the Court indicated that Mullinix's position on 
beneficial use by Killgore of its right was "well taken." Tr., p. 109, LL. 10-15 (Oct. 28, 
2013). The court orally rejected the second basis regarding application ofldaho Code 
§ 42-912. Tr., p. 122, LL. 7-10 (Oct. 28, 2013). The Court took under advisement the 
2 In subsequent proceedings consistent with the Decree returning jurisdiction to decide future disputes, 
Mullinix has had to go to the court seeking assistance because Killgore has twice damaged his valve, 
Killgore has refused to cooperate in having IDWR measure the flows and Killgore has insisted on cutting 
Mullinix off regardless of whether Killgore was using water or not from Joe Creek. As of this writing, the 
court has not heard these disputes. 
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extent to which the decree and findings should be modified to take into consideration the 
role of beneficial use of water on Killgore's land. Id. 
As to the cost bill, the court orally determined that Mullinix was the prevailing 
party and entitled to costs as a matter of right, but denied the request for fees on the 
grounds that Mullinix was not entitled to fees under Idaho Code§ 12-121. Id., p. 121, L. 
22, p. 122, L. 1. Subsequently, the court issued a written Order on costs and fees 
implementing its oral ruling. R. 263. However (as Killgore admits at Briefp. 9), the 
court has not yet issued a written Order on the motion to amend the Decree and Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law regarding beneficial use. 
Killgore filed two notices of appeal, one on November 1, 2013, R. 249, and one 
on December 16, 2013, R. 268, after the Court's Order on costs and fees. Killgore did 
not post a bond or seek a stay of the district's court decree. 
C. Statement of Facts 
In 1928, Wilber Van Wey owned a parcel of land on the Salmon River in the area 
known as the Horseshoe Bend. A portion of that land then owned by Mr. Van Wey is 
now owned by Daryl and Linda Mullinix, 20.1 acres, to be precise. In 1928, the 
Department of Reclamation, what is now the Department of Water Resources, issued a 
license to Mr. Van Wey for 20 cfs of water to irrigate 29 acres ofland, including what is 
now the Mullinix property. Ex. 15. The water right license issued to Mr. Van Wey was 
for water diverted from Joe Creek. Id. The water was conveyed from Joe Creek to the 
Mullinix property by a rock and earth dam in Joe Creek into a ditch conveying water to 
the south and east of Joe Creek. Id. The proof of completion of works and the report of 
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the engineer clearly described the ditch leading from Joe Creek to provide water to 
orchard and other irrigation purposes on what is now the Mullinix parcel. Id. 
The chain of title for the property now owned by Mullinix and the property now 
owned by Killgore stretch back to a common antecedent, James J. Killgore and Josephine 
Killgore, husband and wife (James and Josephine). In 1964, James and Josephine 
acquired land on the Salmon River. R. 167, ,r 1. James and Josephine conveyed a portion 
of their land to Louis and Maude Wiese, including the 20.1 acres of land comprising the 
Mullinix parcel. R. 167, ,r 3-4. Maude Wiese was James' sister. Tr., p. 497, LL. 11-14. 
Mullinix acquired the 21.1 acres, together with all appurtenances from James and 
Josephine and Wiese's successors-in-interest in that parcel. Each of the deeds in the 
chain of title from James and Josephine to Mullinix included all appurtenances. Exs. 1-5. 
In the 1960s after acquiring the property on the Salmon River, James Killgore and 
his sons, Carl and Les, worked to expand the ditch from Joe Creek through what was then 
James' property and later became Mullinix property to the rest ofKillgore's property. 
That ditch from Joe Creek was visible at that time. Tr., p. 454, L. 16-20. In 1966, James 
Killgore filed for a water right to divert 2.6 cfs from Joe Creek to irrigate 130 acres with 
water conveyed by and through the open ditch across Robinson's property and what is 
now the Mullinix property to a reservoir. The place of use for this right included the land 
now owned by Mullinix. Water was then pumped from the reservoir to portions of the 
property owned by James and Josephine including the Mullinix parcel. In 1974 and 
1997, James and Josephine quitclaimed their interests in ownership of the remaining 
property which had not been sold to Wiese, to Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co. R. 167, 
,r 6, Exs. 7 & 8. 
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In about 1987, with significant financial engineering and technical assistance 
from the USDA, Soil Conservation Service, Killgore placed a pipeline in the ditch. Tr., 
p., 289, 2-10). This pipeline followed the course of the old ditch template. Killgore 
received at least $21,000 in six annual installments of $3,500.00 from the United States 
government to reimburse them for the cost of construction of the pipeline. R. 169, 1 17. 
In June of 1988, Killgore submitted a Notice of Claim to Water Right in the 
SRBA for a water from Joe Creek to be delivered in the following manner: "steel 
headgate in creek with 1 O" steel pipe to filter an 8" PVC pipe approx. 4800' to 6" PVC 
mainline and sprinkler system." The place of use for this claim was 130 acres, including 
the 20.1 acres now owned by Mullinix. Ex. 16. When asked to provide proof of 
beneficial use by the Department of Water Resources, Killgore provided two notarized 
affidavits from neighbors stating that the full 130 acres had been irrigated since April 1st 
of 1965. Ex. 16 (last two pages). 
The amount of water requested by Killgore in these applications was 2.6 cfs or 
130 miners inches, enough to provide one inch per acre on each of the 130 acres that 
Killgore claimed. Id. Thereafter, Killgore filed a transfer application with the Department 
of Water Resources in 1998. Ex. 20. The purpose of this transfer was to obtain a new 
point of diversion for an overlapping right that Killgore held for 1.5 cfs diverted from the 
Salmon River. This overlapping right covered the same 130 acres as the Joe Creek right. 
Ex. 20. The Department again asked for information concerning the use of the water on 
the land. Again, Killgore provided statements from neighbors averring that the land was 
irrigated every year since at least 1979. In 1999 Killgore filed an Amended Claim in the 
SRBA asserting that the full 130 acres had been irrigated since the 1960s. Ex. 19. In 
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2002, the Department made an evaluation and concluded that the land covered by the 
water right was irrigated in 1987 (the time of the initiation of the SRBA) and for the 
previous five years. Ex. 20. 
As a result of the applications and statements under oath filed with the 
Department of Water Resources, Killgore was granted the transfer and granted a partial 
decree for a water right from Joe Creek as well as an overlapping right to pump from the 
Salmon River covering the entire 130 acre parcel including the Mullinix parcel. 
In the 1980s, Killgore ripped out the orchard and pulled out the trees. Tr., p., 363, 
LL. 9-20; p. 364, LL. 10-25. For many years the Killgore property sat idle. Id. Heather 
Killgore, the manager of Killgore, the manager of Killgore, testified to the Tax 
Commission in 2000 that "nothing was being done" on the property. Ex. 13. No crops 
were being grown on the property and any sporadic irrigation that took place on the 
Killgore property was simply intended to preserve the water right. Tr., p. 365, LL. 3-8. 
In fact, the Killgore land was assessed and taxed as dry land, not irrigated agriculture, at 
the request of Killgore. Exs. 13-14. 
The Killgore family members could not agree on what to do with this former 
orchard property or how to divide it among themselves, so they decided to subdivide the 
entire property. Tr., p. 366, LL. 1-23. The first phase of the subdivision was platted in 
2000. Ex. 9. The rest of the property was platted into four separate subdivisions between 
2000 and 2009. Exs. 9-12. The Killgore property is divided into 51 lots. Tr., p. 372, LL. 
2-5. Many of the individual lots are sold, but only 14 houses have been built. Tr., p. 373, 
LL. 6-9. Of the original Killgore parcel, Killgore retains only about 40 acres on top of 
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the hill. Tr., p. 401, LL. 15-22. Killgore began irrigating this parcel in 2013, after the 
trial. Id. 
As the lots were sold off from the subdivision, Killgore maintained the water right 
from Joe Creek. Tr., p. 395, LL. 1-5. In fact, when some of the lot owners attempted to 
transfer a portion of the water right to their names, Killgore objected and told the 
Department of Water Resources that Killgore would maintain ownership of the water 
rights in its name. Ex. 21-23. The Department then rejected the proposed transfers. Id. 
In essence, Killgore transformed itself in the 2000 time period into a water company. It 
entered into agreements with some of the lot purchasers to deliver irrigation water to 
them for a fee. Ex. 33, 33A-G; Tr., p. 380-386. The lots were two acres in size, yet 
Killgore by contract limited their use of water to½ acre (or in some cases one acre). Tr., 
p. 384, LL. 8-16; Exs. 33A-G. If the lot owners did not pay their annual assessments, they 
are not entitled to receive water. Tr., p. 385, LL. 9-10; Ex. 33A-G. As a result of this 
scheme, Killgore holds title to the water rights and is responsible for delivery of water to 
lot owners who agree to their conditions. Killgore does not own the land where this 
water is used. The lot owners pay a fee to get water. If they don't pay, they don't get 
water. Id. 
As of the time of trial, six lot owners were participating and receiving between a 
½ acre or an acre worth of water. Tr., p. 386, LL. 1-20; Ex. 33. Killgore was irrigating 
40 acres. Tr., p. 401, LL. 15-21. The rest of the Place of Use ofKillgore's Joe Creek 
right was unimproved and unused. Id.; Tr., p. 364, LL. 20-25; Exs. 13-14. The place of 
use for the Killgore Joe Creek right is 110 acres and 2.2 cfs. R. 171 ,r 30; Ex. 29. 
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Meanwhile, in 2002, Mullinix bought the 20.1 acre parcel that James and 
Josephine had conveyed to James' sister, Maude Weise. R. 167, ,r,r 2-4. Mullinix 
recognized the value of the property for agricultural purposes. They planted an orchard 
and a field of oats. Tr., p. 172, LL. 16-24. Mullinix also recognized the value of a water 
source for the crops on the property. Mr. Mullinix first approached Carl Killgore who 
lives on a parcel between the Mullinix and the Fruit Ranch property. Carl initially agreed 
that Mullinix could use water from the pipe Tr., p. 179, LL. 8-25, but later recanted his 
approval. Tr., p. 180, LL. 10-16. It was at this time that "nothing" was happening on the 
Killgore property. Ex. 13; Tr., p. 571, L. 16, p. 573, L. 11. 
Mullinix began to research his right to water on the parcel. He visited IDWR and 
was advised of the Van Wey water right on his property from 1928 for water from Joe 
Creek. Tr., p. 192, LL. 1-25. The Department assisted him with an application for a late 
claim. The SRBA court granted the late claim and later decreed at water right for 20.1 
acres and 0.4cfs to Mullinix for their property. Based on the water right Mullinix tied 
into the pipeline to deliver Joe Creek water to his property since the pipeline had replaced 
the ditch that was the decreed and licensed conveyance route. Tr., p. 182, LL. 1-25. 
Killgore found out that Mullinix was irrigating, and despite the fact that they had 
no idea how much water they were diverting into the pipeline or how much they were 
using, Carl and Les Killgore destroyed Mullinix's tap. Tr., p. 475, LL. 1-6. 
Killgore then went to the SRBA court and moved to set aside Mullinix' s partial 
decree. R. 171, ,r 29. Because the Killgore and Mullinix decrees both included the 
Mullinix property in the place of use, the SRBA court set aside both Killgore and 
Mullinix decrees. Id. Once the decrees were set aside, Killgore insisted that Mullinix' s 
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right had been forfeited, even though Killgore had on many occasions asserted under oath 
in the SRBA proceedings that their entire place of use, including the Mullinix property 
had been irrigated as recently as 2004. Ex. 16 (last two pages). 
Ultimately the parties agreed to a solution. The 1928 Van Wey right would be 
disallowed, and the parties would split the two Killgore rights (Joe Creek and Salmon 
River), 110 acres to Killgore and 20.1 acres to Mullinix, with a corresponding one-inch 
per acre water right, i.e., 2.2 cfs to Killgore and 0.4 cfs to Mullinix. R. 171, ,r 30. The 
parties and the Department signed SF5s to that effect. The Special Master recommended 
and the SRBA court decreed the Joe Creek water rights to the parties with 2.2 cfs to 
Killgore, 0.4 cfs to Mullinix on parcels of 110 and 20.1 acres respectively. Id.; Exs. 29-
30. 
The parties also executed a separate settlement agreement. Ex. 27. Relevant 
provisions of that agreement were that Mullinix would move his point of diversion below 
Killgore's, that the parties had not agreed to a resolution of their claims to the 
conveyance system and that the agreement contained an integration clause. Id. ,r 3 & 7. 
Nothing in the agreement states how far below Killgore's point of diversion that Mullinix 
would establish a diversion. Ex. 27. Even though Carl Killgore thinks the agreement 
should have done so. Tr., p. 348, LL. 1-19. 
After the new decrees were entered, Mullinix began investigating ways to provide 
Joe Creek water to his place of use. Given past difficulties with Killgore, Mullinix 
acquired some pipe and even sent out a request for bids to install a second pipe running 
next to the existing pipe. Tr., p. 208, LL. 12-17; p. 420, LL. 2-15. Given the practical 
difficulties of digging next to an unlocated pressurized pipe, the risk of damage and 
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liability, no one would even bid on the project. Tr., p. 420, L. 4, p. 421, L. 13; p. 286, LL 
3-21; p. 287, LL. 22-23. The topography made it impractical to blaze another route 
through the steep terrain. Tr., p. 435, L. 10, p. 436, L. 5. So, Mullinix abandoned those 
efforts. 
Mullinix turned on the remaining undamaged tap to irrigate his outfield. Tr., p. 
300, L. 12, p. 301, L. 16. Under cover of night, Carl and Les Killgore again vandalized 
the tap. Tr., p. 476, LL. 18-25. 
Frustrated with Killgore's unwillingness to work with him and repeated threats 
Tr., p. 325, LL. 1-17, Mullinix filed this lawsuit seeking a declaration of their right to use 
the conveyance system to bring water from Joe Creek. R. 9. In keeping with the terms of 
the SRBA settlement agreement and the right to divert from Joe Creek, Mullinix designed 
and proposed a system to divert from below Killgore's existing weir into a separate 
bubbler (or filter) and thence into the pipeline. Ex. 51. From an engineering standpoint, 
the pipeline has the capacity to accept the full 2.6 cfs of both Mullinix and Killgore water 
rights. Tr., p. 459, LL. 15-25. Killgore's pipe sizes down from 8" through Mullinix 
property to 4" and 6" on the Killgore property. Tr., p. 490, LL. 23, p. 491, LL. 1-9. 
Therefore, taking Mullinix's 0.4 cfs out above the reduction in size harms neither the 
capacity of Killgore's delivery system on their property. Mullinix's engineering proposal 
was confirmed as workable without harm to Killgore by the very person who helped 
design the pipeline for them with the Soil Conservation Service. Tr., p. 348, LL. 1-19. 
Killgore had no contrary testimony, lay or expert. 
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II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the appeal is premature as the district court has not yet ruled on 
Mullinix's motion for reconsideration of a portion of the Decree and the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. 
2. Whether Killgore as a water delivery entity which delivers water to third 
parties for a fee is obligated to provide water to Mullinix under Idaho Code § 42-912. 
3. Whether Killgore is precluded by the principles of res judicata and 
collateral estoppel from arguing non-use of water on the Mullinix parcel from Joe Creek. 
4. Whether Mullinix is entitled to use the pipeline under the decisions of 
Keyser v. Moorehead, 23 Idaho 501, 130 P. 992 (1913), Reynolds Irrigation Dist. v. 
Sproat, 69 Idaho 315,206 P.2d 774 (1948), Tomehak v. Harris, 54 Idaho 448, 32 P.20 
1025 (1934), and Idaho Code§ 42-1207. 
5. Whether Killgore can shut Mullinix's use off even when Killgore is not 
putting the full amount of its water right to beneficial use. 
III. ATTORNEYS' FEES ON APPEAL 
In conformance with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(b)(5), Mullinix seeks an award of 
their attorneys' fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code§ 12-121, and Appellate Rules 40 
and 41. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review 
Findings of fact cannot be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous, 
i.e. not supported by substantial, competent evidence. Rice v. Hill City Stock Yards, Co., 
121 Idaho 576, 826 P.2d 1288 (1992); Jenkins v. State, Dept. of Water Resources, 103 
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Idaho 384, 389, 647 P.2d 1256, 1261 (1982). An appellate court cannot substitute its 
opinion of witness' credibility for that of the trier of fact. Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing 
Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253,256 (1991). This standard reflects the deference 
to be afforded a trial court's unique opportunity to assess and weigh the credibility of the 
witnesses who appear before it. State v. Tierney, 109 Idaho 474,476, 708 P.2d 879, 881 
(1985). The reviewing court does not weigh the evidence or substitute its judgment from 
that of the trial court. Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 322, 297 
P.3d 1134, 1139 (2013). It is only when an issue is one oflaw that the Court exercises 
free review of the trial court's decision. Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Idaho 610, 
826 P.2d 1322 (1992), Savage Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 
241-242, 869 P.2d 554, 558-559 (1993). 
"This Court limits its review of a trial court's decision to determining "whether 
the evidence supports the fmdings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the 
conclusions oflaw." Unless the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous, they 
will not be set aside. Accordingly, "even if the evidence is conflicting, if the findings of 
fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence [we] will not disturb those 
fmdings on appeal." Conversely, when reviewing a trial court's conclusions oflaw, "this 
Court is not bound by the legal conclusions of the trial court, but may draw its own 
conclusions from the facts presented." Credit Swisse AG, Cayman Islands Branch v. 
Teufel Nursery, Inc.,_ Idaho_, 321 P.3d 739, 744 (March 19, 2014), quoting City of 
Meridian v. Petra Inc., 154 Idaho 425, 434-35, 299 P.3d 232, 241-42 (2013). 
When reviewing a trial court's discretionary decision, we determine "( 1) whether 
the court perceived the issue as discretionary; (2) whether the court acted within the 
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bounds of that discretion and applied the correct legal standards; and (3) whether the 
court reached its decision through an exercise of reason." Bettwieser v. New York 
Irrigation Dist., 154 Idaho 317, 322, 297 P.3d 1134, 1139 (2013) quoting, Am. Pension 
Servs., Inc. v. Cornerstone Home Builders, LLC, 147 Idaho 638,641 213 P.3d 1038, 
1041 (2009) (citing Hayward v. Valley Vista Care Corp, 136 Idaho 342,345, 33 P.3d 
816, 819 (2001). 
The Supreme Court's review of the district court's ruling on equitable remedies is 
limited to an abuse of discretion standard. Climax, LLC v. Snake River Oncology, 149 
Idaho 791, 794-5, 241 P.3d 964, 967-8 (2010); O'Connor v. Harger, 145 Idaho 904,909, 
188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008). 
Likewise, a challenge to the trial court's determination of the prevailing party is a 
matter committed to the discretion of the trial court which will not be disturbed on appeal 
without a showing of an abuse of discretion. Lower Payette Ditch Co. v. Harvey, 152 
Idaho 291, 295-96, 271 P.3d 689, 693-4 (2012); Bream v. Benscoter, 139 Idaho 364,368, 
79 P.3d 723, 727 (2003). 
When the trial court reaches the correct result by an erroneous theory, the Court 
will affirm on the correct theory. Stapleton v. Jack Cushman Drilling & Pump Co., 153 
Idaho 735,740,291 P.3d 418,423 (2012); Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist., v. Mussell, 139 
Idaho 28, 33, 72 P.3d 686, 973 (2003). 
B. Is there Jurisdiction to Hear this Appeal? 
As this Court has noted, "numerous civil cases in Idaho hold that a premature 
notice of appeal is ineffective to vest jurisdiction on appeal." Spokane Structures, Inc. v. 
Equitable Investment, LLC, 148 Idaho 616,621,226 P.3d 1263, 1268 (2010), quoting 
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Department of Health and Welfare v. Doe, 147 Idaho 357, 358-59, 209 P.3d 654, 655-56 
(2009). Given that the question is jurisdictional and can be raised at any time, including 
sua sponte by the Court, Mullinix believes it is important to bring the question of 
jurisdiction to the Court's attention. The district court entered its Decree and Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law on September 23, 2013. R. 221,223. Mullinix filed a 
timely motion for reconsideration asking the court to amend a portion of the Decree and 
Findings of Fact on two independent grounds. R. 239. The first ground related to the 
language in the court's Decree concerning the use of the pipeline to convey water to 
Mullinix when the flows in the creek dropped below 2.6 cfs. Mullinix was concerned 
that this language would be construed by Killgore to allow them to shut Mullinix off 
without regard to whether Killgore was putting their full water right to beneficial use. 
This was important because Killgore, at the time of trial, were irrigating less than half of 
the land described in their place of use. Tr., p. 401, LL. 15-19. 
The district court found that the position of Mullinix was "well taken" but decided 
that it would take the matter under advisement and issue a written Order. Tr., p. 122, LL. 
10-16. As of this time, no written Order has been issued. 
The second grounds for the motion for reconsideration dealt with the application 
ofldaho Code§ 42-912. The court orally denied that portion of the motion for 
reconsideration at the hearing. Tr., p. 122, LL. 7-10. Following the hearing, Killgore 
filed a notice of appeal. R. 249. After the court issued its written Order on costs and 
fees, R. 263, Mullinix filed a second notice of appeal to include the Order on costs and 
fees. R. 268. As of this date, no written finding has been made by the court on the 
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motion to reconsider a portion of the Decree and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. 
Idaho Appellate Rule 14( a) provides, "the time for an appeal from any civil 
judgment or order in an action is terminated by the filing of a timely motion which, if 
granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law, or any judgment in the 
action .... in which case, the appeal period for all judgments or orders commences to run 
upon the date of the clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion." Since 
Mullinix's motion for reconsideration asks the court to modify both certain of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and the Decree, that motion clearly "could 
affect" the Findings and the Decree. Thus, it appears that Killgore's appeal is premature 
under the language of Rule 14(a). The Court of Appeals has held that both Rule 59 
motions and motions to reconsider under Rule 11 tolled the time period for filing a notice 
of appeal under Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a). State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659,661, 67 
P.3d 1271, 1273, (Ct. App. 2002). 
Rule 17( e )(2) provides that the premature filing of a notice of appeal will become 
valid when the district court files and the clerk stamps the Order. However, the district 
court has yet to issue its written findings on that motion. 
An earlier decision of this court that precedes the adoption of the Idaho Appellate 
Rules touches on this issue. Coeur d'Alene Tur/Club, Inc. v. Cogswell, 93 Idaho 324, 46 
P .2d 107 (1969). There, the Court created a limited exception and concluded that when a 
motion to amend the judgment is made in the trial court and when the face of the motion 
makes it clear that it could not possibly change the rights and liabilities of the parties, and 
then the same party who made the motion files an appeal, and when the portion of the 
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judgment appealed from has no connection to the part sought to be amended, then the 
Court can proceed with the appeal. 93 Idaho at 329,461 P.2d at 112. 
Here, the issue of Mullinix' s right to use the pipeline and to what extent is the 
central issue in the case. Here, one party made the motion to amend. The other party 
appealed. The same party did not both appeal and file the motion for reconsideration. It 
would appear, based both on the Idaho Appellate Rules and this court's prior 
jurisprudence, that the court lacks jurisdiction to hear the appeal until such time as the 
district court enters an order on the motion for reconsideration. 
C. Introduction to This Appeal 
At its core, Killgore' s appeal is an attack on the discretionary decisions of the 
district court in its capacity as a court of equity, trying the parties opposing claims to 
injunctive relief. Yet, Killgore does not even mention the trial court's discretion 
anywhere in its brief. Likely, that is because Killgore realizes that when viewed through 
an abuse of discretion standard, its chances on appeal are nil. By failing to raise the issue 
of abuse of discretion by the district court, Killgore is precluded from arguing on reply 
that the district court abused its discretion below in any manner. Telford v. Smith County, 
Texas, 155 Idaho 497,502,314 P.3d 179, 184 (2013). In particular, the manner in which 
the court determined to order the connection to the pipe, in light of Killgore' s obstruction, 
was a discretionary call by the court that is not and cannot be challenged as an abuse of 
discretion. The court made a very careful effort to balance the equities and the parties' 
interests. 
Killgore's appeal appears to rest on an attempt to claim that the pipe, a 
conveyance for water, is the same thing as the point of diversion. Brief p. 18. At least 
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Killgore has obfuscated this point with its less than clear choice of words. This attempt to 
confound a point of diversion with the pipeline is Killgore's effort to have the settlement 
agreement in the SRBA mean something other than what it says on the face of the 
agreement. The settlement expressly did not resolve the conveyance rights in the pipe. 
Ex. 27, ,r 7. This is the same mistake that Killgore made at trial. Tr., p. 389, L. 19, p. 
391, L. 20. The point of diversion is the diversion structure in the creek, not the pipe. 
Ex. 48, last photograph, showing diversion structure in the creek. 
More fundamentally, Killgore's appeal constitutes a direct attack on Mullinix's 
water right and the SRBA decree. Killgore's brief is replete with references to lack of 
irrigation on the Mullinix parcel prior to the SRBA decree and alleged mistakes in 
claiming the water right, while ignoring contrary evidence submitted under oath by 
Killgore and others to the SRBA court and the Department of Water Resources. More 
importantly Killgore ignores the effect of the decree. Killgore now asks this Court to 
weigh the evidence and retry the use of water on Mullinix's land contrary to the SRBA 
decree. This Killgore cannot do. 
The facts when construed most strongly in favor of the prevailing party support 
the court's conclusion that Mullinix is entitled to use the ditch from Joe Creek to his 
property and the replacement pipeline. 
D. Killgore is Precluded by the Doctrines of Res Judicata and Collateral 
Estoppel from Attacking the Use of Water on Mullinix's Property 
from Joe Creek 
As noted above, much of the argument on appeal by Killgore seeks to have this 
Court weigh the evidence and determine that water was not used on Mullinix' s property 
from Joe Creek. Killgore admits that water was conveyed by the ditch to Joe Creek and 
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put to use on what is now the Mullinix property to grow a crop of potatoes. R. 169,115; 
Tr., p. 461, LL. 4-10. However, Killgore then argues that one year was the only use of 
water on the Mullinix property. Killgore also admits that when the SRBA partial decrees 
for the Mullinix and Killgore water rights were set aside, Killgore asserted to the SRBA 
court that Mullinix water right had been forfeited for non-use. Appellate' s Brief, p. 1. 
Killgore made these claims in spite of their own evidence submitted under oath that the 
entire 130 acre parcel covered by the water rights obtained by their predecessor James 
Killgore included the 20 acres now owned by Mullinix then owned by James Killgore's 
sister.Exs.16, 19-20. 
Killgore would have both the district court and this Court ignore the fact that they 
argued for forfeiture on the Mullinix property by non-use and yet the final decree granted 
Mullinix a water right over their prior contention of forfeiture for non-use. Killgore 
seems to think that they can argue non-use to the SRBA court, stipulate that a water right 
should be issued to Mullinix for use on his property, allow the partial decree to be 
entered, and now come back and claim that even though Mullinix is entitled to a water 
right Mullinix is not entitled to a conveyance right for this same water because of non-use 
of water on Mullinix's property. The same set of operative facts underlie both claims by 
Killgore-that water was or was not used on Mullinix's property. Crow v. Carlson, 107 
Idaho 461, 465-66, 690 P.2d 916, 920-21 (1984), holds that the decree is binding on all 
parties as to the use of the water on the land and that it would be "unwise and unjust" to 
overturn the decree. Here, the parties are the same in both actions, Killgore and Mullinix. 
The issue is the same, whether Mullinix used water on his property from Joe Creek. 
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"Claim preclusion bars adjudication not only of the matters offered and received 
to defeat the claim but every matter which might and should have been litigated in the 
first suit." Tycor Title Company v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 126, 157 P.3d 613,620 
(2007). As the Court noted in Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 82, 
278 P.3d 943, 952 (2012), where the underlying issue pervading the present case are 
identical to those in the original action, the Court will not allow the party to relitigate. 
In addition to this Court's res judicata and collateral estoppel law, Killgore is 
precluded from attempting to relitigate the use of water on the Mullinix property under 
the statutes and case law governing the SRBA. Idaho Code§ 14-420 provides that 
"The Decree entered in a general adjudication shall be conclusive as to 
the nature and extent of all water rights in the adjudicated water system 
" 
In Basin Wide Issue 16, regarding the form and content of the final unified 
decree, issues were raised by certain parties as to the preclusive effect of the decrees in 
the SRBA. All parties to the SRBA are technically parties to the basin wide issue. In 
addition, Killgore's law firm also made an appearance in the Basin Wide 16 proceeding, 
prior to the trial in this matter. In Basin Wide 16, the City of Pocatello argued that the 
decree was preclusive only as to the issues actually litigated before the SRBA court. The 
court rejected the City's argument and held that even though a claim is uncontested, it is 
decided on its merits because of the role of both the Department and the court in 
reviewing the claims. Memorandum Decision and Order on Challenge in the Matter of 
the Final Unified Decree pages 10-11 (http://www.srba.state.id.us/Images/2012-
06/0092099xx00199.TIF) (accessed July 7, 2014). Accordingly, the fact that the parties 
entered into a settlement agreement, withdrew their objections to water rights held by the 
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other, and signed an SF5 does not mean that the issue concerning the use of water on the 
Mullinix property was not decided and decreed. Quite the contrary, according both to 
Idaho Code§ 42-1420 and the SRBA court's decision. The court's decision on the Final 
Unified Decree was not appealed and therefore is a final decision also binding on the 
parties to the SRBA. 
Second, the Memorandum Decision and Order on Challenge in the Matter of the 
Final Unified Decree also establishes that water from Joe Creek was used on the Mullinix 
property at least as of 1987, the date of the commencement of the adjudication. The 
SRBA court's rule on tolling of the forfeiture statute also means that the Mullinix water 
right as decreed in 2011 is preclusive as against any claim of non-use of the water and 
particularly as against Killgore who made that assertion prior to the entry of Mullinix's 
partial decree. Accordingly, Killgore's attempt to convince this court that Mullinix did 
not use water on their property from Joe Creek are barred by res judicata, collateral 
estoppels, Idaho Code § 42-1420 and the SRBA precedents. 
E. Mullinix has a Right to Use the Ditch and the Irrigation Pipe 
Appellant argues that Mullinix has no "prior" right to the ditch or the irrigation 
pipe bringing water from Joe Creek. This argument rests on the untenable factual and 
legal assertion of non-use of water on the Mullinix property. The District Court found: 
Mullinix are the successors in interest to a portion (0.4 cubic feet per 
second) of water right No. 79-4001 appropriated and held by James and 
Josephine Killgore for use on lands which included the Mullinix parcel. 
Mullinix are the current owners and successors in interest to land ... held 
previously by both James and Josephine Killgore and Louis and Maude 
Weise. Under Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution, Mullinix, 
as successors in interest to James and Josephine Killgore and Louis and 
Maude Weise, have a legal interest in the continuing rights to water as 
guaranteed by Idaho's constitution. Under Idaho Code§ 42-101, Mullinix, 
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as successors in interest to land ... have a legal interest in the continuing 
water rights as established by Idaho statute .... 
R. 228-29. 
Mullinix received their 20.1 acre parcel from James Killgore, a common 
predecessor in interest who severed and sold the Mullinix parcel ( and water rights) 
together with all their appurtenances, which was transferred through the chain of title to 
Mullinix. R. 222. Crow v. Carlson, 107 Idaho 461,467,690 P.2d 916,922 (1984), 
provides that when land is divided all appurtenances go with the divided land, including 
water rights, unless the water is reserved. Here there was no reservation. 
Killgore argues that there is a "separation of title" between James and Josephine 
Killgore, Maude & Louis Weise and Mullinix. Killgore ignores that the 1965 water right 
was perfected on the Weise property before Weise transferred title to Greene in 1971. 
Ex. 2. They also ignore that Mullinix's water right derives from the original James 
Killgore water right by virtue of the decree. R. 171130. Appurtenances include both the 
water rights and the right to the ditch and easements. Malony v. Davis, 40 Idaho 443, 
449, 233 P. 1000, 1001 (l 925)("water and the ditches through which the same is 
conveyed to lands become appurtenant to the land when used upon or in connection with 
such land."). 
In addition, once the person acquires the right to use the water, the right is 
appurtenant and inured to the benefit of "all who might then have or subsequently acquire 
an interest in the premises." Id. Killgore admits that water was delivered to the Mullinix 
Parcel from Joe Creek to grow crops by way of the earthen ditch carrying water from Joe 
Creek to the Mullinix Parcel. R. 169. Once water is applied to an agricultural use, the 
right to irrigate cannot be denied. Idaho Constitution, Article XV,§ 4. There is no 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 26 
question that Mullinix's water right derives from the parent right originally perfected on 
that land by James Killgore. R. 226. Killgore seems to argue that Weise (Mullinix's 
predecessor and James Killgore' s sister) acquired no interest in the water right or the 
ditch when the ditch was used to bring water to her property from Joe Creek. But 
Killgore has failed to support that notion with any authority. Therefore, this argument 
should be deemed abandoned. Bettwieser v. New York Irrigation Dist., supra. 
First, Killgore's chain of title argument seems to assert that Mullinix is not 
entitled to the portion of the water right perfected on the Weise/Mullinix parcel. This 
claim must be rejected on res judicata and collateral estoppel. See Section D above. 
Second, there is no question that the ditch existed and delivered water under this 
right to the Weise property from Joe Creek. Killgore agrees. Brief. p. 19. Thus, the 
Weise property included both the water right and the ditch right and these were conveyed 
to Mullinix. R. 222, Exs. 1-5. This ditch right appurtenant to the Mullinix parcel was 
perfected in 1928 by Wilber Van Wey and again in the 1960s by James Killgore to 
deliver water to the Mullinix parcel by this ditch. 
Killgore suggests that there had to have been a five or twenty year period of 
adverse possession to perfect a right to use the ditch. Brief p. 19. Killgore then asserts 
that use of the ditch does not establish a right to the ditch. Killgore cites no authority for 
either claim. Indeed, there is none. First, the existence of a visible ditch establishes 
notice of the right of way. Idaho Code§ 42-1102. The ditch was visible in 1928, Ex. 15, 
and it was still visible in the 1960s. Tr., p. 454, L. 3, p. 455, L. 16. According to the Van 
Wey water right, the ditch was entirely on the Van Wey ranch. Ex. 15, p. 4. So there 
was no need to acquire an easement from a third party. When the property was divided, 
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however, the ditch remained appurtenant to the land served. Maloney v. Davis, 40 Idaho 
at 449, 233 P. at 1001. "No appurtenance is more important to, or more directly effects 
the value of arid agricultural land than water and ditch rights for irrigation." Shrives v. 
Talbot, 88 Idaho 209,217,398 P.2d 448,452 (1965). 
Killgore does not argue on appeal and did not argue below that Mullinix or any of 
their predecessors in interest abandoned their right to use the ditch. Accordingly, they 
cannot raise an abandonment issue here. Martin v. Smith, 154 Idaho 161, 164 296 P.3d 
367, 390 (2013). Moreover, mere non-use of an easement does not amount to an 
abandonment. There must be an unequivocal and intentional act to abandon. Hawkins v. 
Bonneville County Bd Of Comm 'rs, 151 Idaho 228,234,254 P.3d 1224, 1230 (2011). 
The trial testimony made it very clear that Mullinix did his utmost to use the old ditch 
right of way. There is no testimony or evidence that any of the predecessors in interest 
from Van Wey to James Killgore to Maude Weise had any intent to abandon the right to 
use the ditch. Thus, the right to the ditch has been established and has not been lost. 
F. Mullinix's Right to Use the Ditch Continues in the Pipeline 
The ditch follows a route from Joe Creek around a steep hillside. Tr., p. 168, LL. 
15-25; see generally Ex. 48. The banks were subject to sloughing and washouts. 
Therefore, in 1987, Killgore decided to pipe the ditch. The USDA Soil Conservation 
Service provided the engineering at government cost. Tr., p. 346, L. 25 - 347, L. 6. The 
United States also reimbursed Killgore for $21,000 for the cost of the pipeline. R. 224. 
Killgore offered no testimony on what, if any, unreimbursed costs it might have incurred. 
The pipeline followed the original ditch location. Tr., p. 468, LL. 11-14. Killgore 
covered up the ditch and placed the pipe. T. 468, LL. 11-20. The evidence demonstrates 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 28 
that the pipeline has more than enough capacity to carry both Mullinix and Killgore's 
water rights, 2.6 cfs. Ex. 16; Tr., p. 249, L. 25, p. 25, L. 13; Tr. p. 504, L. 24, p. 505, L. 3. 
Indeed, Killgore's water right claimed that it could do so. Id. 
Killgore testified at trial that this is their pipe and for Mullinix to put water in and 
take it out amounts to "stealing" water, even after a water right was decreed to Mullinix. 
Tr. 500, LL. 24-25. It appears that Killgore is fixed on the issue of "ownership" of the 
pipe as giving them a right to exclude Mullinix. 
This notion that a user can pipe a ditch and exclude the other ditch user is simply 
wrong. The law in Idaho has for one hundred years recognized the right of a ditch user to 
use the pipeline which replaced the ditch. Keyser v. Moorehead, 23 Idaho 501, 130 
P. 992 (1913), establishes Mullinix's right to connect to the pipeline to convey Mullinix's 
Joe Creek water right to the Mullinix parcel. In Keyser, the plaintiff and defendants had 
separate water rights, and all parties received their water from the Lower Payette Ditch 
Company via a private lateral. The flume that carried the water fell into disrepair. The 
defendants replaced the flume in the same old right of way with a pipeline-which 
plaintiff originally had no interest in paying for. Id at 504. After the pipeline was 
constructed and plaintiff was denied water from the pipeline, the plaintiff sought to buy 
into the pipeline-but his request was denied by defendants. Id. This Court held that the 
plaintiff had the same right to the pipeline as he had to the pre-existing ditch as long as he 
paid for his proportionate share of building the pipeline. This Court determined that the 
users of the pre-existing ditch were co-owners of the ditch as tenants in common. When 
the pipeline was constructed, it occupied the same right of way as the flume and by such 
construction the pipeline became a part of the ditch. Id. This Court held that by making 
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this improvement the pipe became a part of the ditch and the plaintiff, as an owner in the 
ditch and in the flume became an owner in the pipe made a part of the ditch. 
The defendants in Keyser argued that the plaintiff could just build a separate 
pipeline-however, the court rejected that approach because a "large and unnecessary 
expense will be imposed upon him." Id. at 505. Killgore tried the same approach here as 
the defendants in Keyser, but the district court rejected that demand. 
Mullinix owns water right number 79-14234 and Killgore own water right 
number 79-14233. Both split from the parent right number 79-4001. R. 226. As in 
Keyser v. Moorehead, Mullinix, as successor in interest to James Killgore and Maude 
Weise's land and the successor in interest to the split of water right number 79-4001, has 
an interest in the ditch. R. 228-229, ,i 6. Like the defendant in Keyser, Killgore has 
converted the ditch into a pipeline by installing the pipeline in the same location as the 
ditch. Thus, when Killgore converted the ditch into a pipeline, Mullinix's right to use the 
ditch was not extinguished. It continues in the existing pipeline. 
Idaho Code § 42-1207 provides that a person may change or pipe a ditch, as long 
as he does so without harming another who has an interest in the ditch. Savage Lateral 
Water Users Ass 'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237, 869 P.2d 554 (1994). Thus, when a pipeline 
is installed in a ditch that pipeline must be done in such a way as not to injure Mullinix 
and others with an interest in the ditch. Ramseyer v. Jamerson, 78 Idaho 504, 305 P.2d 
1088 (1957). Here, Killgore takes pride in not providing a method for Mullinix ( or his 
predecessors) to irrigate from the ditch, contrary to their legal obligation. Tr., p. 475, 
L. 1, p. 477, L. 20. 
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The issue of payment for the right to use the pipeline improvement was raised in 
pre-trial proceedings. R. 178. Killgore ignored that option of requesting reimbursement. 
They offered no testimony of the cost they incurred of the improvements. The only 
testimony was that the United States had engineered the pipeline and paid $21,000 to 
Killgore for this improvement. 
The district court ordered payment of an annual maintenance fee, based on what 
Killgore charges other users of the subdivision. R. 234. The court did not order payment 
of any proportionate share of the construction costs, but there was no evidence of any 
costs Killgore incurred that were not reimbursed by the government. Hence, there can be 
no error in not ordering such reimbursement, particularly when Killgore was given the 
option of asking for reimbursement and chose not to. Moreover, any failure to order 
payment for a share of the construction costs was not assigned as an error on appeal and 
has thus been waived. Martin v. Smith, supra. 
G. Mullinix as Owner of Servient Estate has the Right to Use the Ditch. 
Another ground presented to the district court below, but not ruled on directly is 
the right of the servient estate owner to use the ditch that crosses his property. R. 179; 
Tr., p. 4, L. 19, p. 5, L. 3. This rule is also well established and provides the servient 
owner the right to use his property, including the ditch crossing it, as long as he can do so 
without interference with the delivery of water. 
In Reynolds Irr. Dist. v. Sproat, 69 Idaho 315, 333, 206 P .3d 774, 785 (1948), this 
Court held that the owners of the servient estate are entitled to use the land occupied by 
the ditch in any way and for any purpose not inconsistent with the easement. This right 
includes the right to use the ditch itself to convey water. Coulsen v. Aberdeen-Springfield 
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Canal Co., 47 Idaho 619,277 P. 542,546 (1929). In Tomehak v. Harris, this court stated 
that 
If the Pyke and Roscoe ditch as now constructed is capable of being used 
by appellants without injury to or interference with respondents' use of 
the ditch, or appellants may, without interference with or injury to 
respondents' use of the easement, enlarge or change the same, but 
without increasing the burden of maintenance or changing respondents' 
method of use, at appellants' own expense, so that appellants may with 
proper measuring devices carry their water therein, they have the right so 
to do. 
Tomehak v. Harris, 54 Idaho 448, 32 P.2d 1025, 1026 (1934) (internal citations omitted) 
Here, Mullinix has agreed not to call for water from Joe Creek when it is needed 
for beneficial use by Killgore. Tr., p. 282 LL. 1-9; Ex. 27, ,r 4. The court authorized a 
system to divert into the pipeline in the "best and most effective" way based on the trial 
testimony. R. 229. It would increase pressure and benefit both parties. Id Killgore is 
unmoved. They claimed that interference in delivery to the water users on their property 
is "beside the point." Tr., p. 388, LL. 9-11. Killgore could only speculate that there 
"could be" interference. Id. LL. 12-15. To the contrary, the trial evidence demonstrated 
that the pipe will carry 2.6 cfs with no problems. Tr., p. 249, 1. 25. Nor will it affect the 
pressure. Tr., p. 309, LL. 4-9. The soil conservation technician who worked on the 
original pipeline agreed that with the second bubbler (ultimately authorized by the court), 
the pipe would take even more water without affecting pressure. Ex. 51, Tr., p. 34 7, 1. 
25; 3461. 19; Tr., p. 355, 1. 12-356 1. 5. A bigger issue for Killgore is that the pipe sizes 
down from 8" diameter to 6" diameter after leaving Mullinix's property. Tr., p. 244, 
1. 11-13; 256 LL. 11-24; Ex. 16, p. 4. In addition, Killgore has a pressure relief valve on 
the pipe along Joe Creek that reduces the pressure on the pipeline. Tr., p. 249 LL. 4-14; 
Tr., p. 255, LL. 12-19. 
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Hence, the testimony supports the fact that Mullinix can use water (0.4 of the 
original 2.6 cfs granted to Killgore) without interference. The pipeline can take it and 
will not harm Killgore. In addition, the court retained jurisdiction to handle any future 
disputes. R. 234, ,r 4. Should an issue of actual interference arise, the district court could 
impose appropriate conditions. 
H. Killgore's Easement Agreement Does not Extinguish any Rights 
Mullinix or His Predecessors Have 
Very briefly, almost off-handedly, Killgore argues that when James Killgore 
obtained an easement from Robinson to cross the Robinson property in 1972 that 
easement somehow defeats and extinguishes any and all claims by Mullinix to the ditch. 
Brief p. 21. There are several interesting points about this easement document. Ex. F. 
First, it was obtained by James Killgore, not the company. Second, it was obtained long 
after the ditch was reconstructed, after water rights were obtained for all 130 acres, and 
after the right to use the ditch established. Idaho Code § 42-1102. Third, the point of 
diversion reference does not match the current point of diversion. Fourth, it does not 
purport to grant any right across Mullinix's parcel. Nevertheless, Killgore's easement 
has no effect on the original rights to use the ditch. It did not purport to extinguish any 
prior rights of third parties, nor could it. The district court recognized it did not have 
jurisdiction over the Robinson parcel and made no attempt to a quiet title regarding an 
easement over Robinson's land. 
As it relates to Killgore's interest in the ditch and pipeline, the district court found 
that Mullinix has an interest in that conveyance based upon the fact that Mullinix are 
successors in interest to the landowners and the parent water right. R. 229. Clearly James 
Killgore was attempting to document the ditch right across Robinson's for an "existing 
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irrigation canal or ditch." That ditch right was intended to convey the 2.6 water right 
which the SRBA court later split and decreed a portion to Mullinix. Thus, even if the 
easement was exclusive it includes all the water conveyance obtained by James Killgore 
before 1971, including the portion now held by Mullinix. 
I. Constructing the Pipeline without an Outlet for Mullinix did not 
Extinguish Mullinix's Right to a Conveyance 
It is unclear what Killgore is exactly arguing in this section of its brief (pp. 21-
22)-perhaps abandonment or forfeiture. Such an argument is not supported by any 
citation of authority and should therefore be deemed waived. Stapleton v. Jack Cushman 
Drilling and Pump Co., 153 Idaho 735,291 P.3d 418 (2012) (failure to provide either 
authority or argument results in waiver of an issue on appeal). 
As to forfeiture, this argument holds no merit as Mullinix has a water right that 
stemmed from the parent water right-79-14234 partially decreed May 31, 2011. R. 226. 
In fact, Killgore raised forfeiture in the SRBA, but ultimately conceded that Mullinix had 
a water right, which the court so decreed. As Mullinix has a valid water right that was 
partially decreed, less than three years ago--there is no forfeiture. See discussion of 
forfeiture in the SRBA court's Memorandum Decision and Order on Challenge in the 
Matter of the Final Unified Decree, pp. 10-12 (http://www.srba.state.id.us/Images/20l2-
06/0092099xx00199.TIF) (accessed July 7, 2014). 
Mere nonuse of an easement right alone does not amount to abandonment. There 
must be an unequivocal and intentional act to abandon. Hawkins v. Bonneville County Bd 
Of Comm 'rs, 151 Idaho 228,254 P.3d 1224 (2011). Because there is no evidence 
suggesting any actual intent to abandon, Mullinix still has an interest in the ditch and 
easement and can use it to convey his water right. 
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J. The SRBA Settlement Agreement specifically Reserves Mullinix's 
Right to Assert an Interest in the Conveyance System. 
Killgore next argues that the settlement agreement between Killgore and Mullinix 
in the SRBA resolved all the issues currently before the court and that the doctrine of 
laches, estoppel and waiver bar Mullinix's interest or claims. Ex. 27. The district court 
rejected that argument. The court stated in another context, "the issues of the pipeline 
and the easement were left open and that's what this litigation was all about." Tr., p. 121, 
LL. 19-21 (October 28, 2013). 
The settlement agreement states, "[t]his is the complete agreement between the 
parties concerning the elements of the water rights at issue in these subcases and 
nothing in this agreement shall be construed as a determination or acknowledgment 
of any party's right to an easement, right-of-way or conveyance system." Ex. 27, ,r 7. 
This language is clear and unambiguous. The parties did not settle the right to the 
pipeline or other conveyance system. Killgore's argument otherwise is frivolous. 
The SRBA settlement agreement resulted in a decree for the elements of the water 
rights in the SRBA. Killgore's arguments for waiver, estoppel and laches are all based on 
the misplaced notion that the SRBA settlement resolved all the issues between the parties 
related to the conveyance system. A ditch is a right of way for the passage of water. 
Williams v. Neddo, 66 Idaho 551,565, 163 P.2d 306,312, (1945). The settlement 
agreement expressly reserved the issue of the right to the easement, right of way, or 
conveyance system. 
So how does Killgore construe the settlement agreement as barring any claim to 
use the easement, right of way or pipeline? Mostly, Killgore tries to assert that the pipe 
and the point of diversion are the same thing. Killgore cites to the provision in the 
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agreement that Mullinix would move their point of diversion below Killgore' s as proof 
that the agreement meant, despite the contrary language in paragraph 7, that Mullinix had 
agreed not to establish a right to use the pipe or the ditch. 
Carl Killgore's position at trial was that the settlement agreement required 
Mullinix to take water out of the creek where the ditch crosses the creek, even though the 
agreement did not say that. Tr., p. 389, L. 15, p. 390, L. 7. Even he was forced to admit 
that the pipe was not really the point of diversion. Tr., p. 390, L. 20. 
After the agreement was signed, Mullinix reviewed several alternative methods of 
installing his point of diversion. Mr. Mullinix was concerned that a point of division at 
the crossing would have interfered with the pressure in the pipe to Killgore. Tr., p. 609, 
LL. 2-14. So he designed a diversion structure below Killgore that would allow the same 
static pressure to build up to put water into the pipe by means of a bubbler. Ex. 51; Tr., p. 
250, L. 14, p. 256, L. 24. This proposal was supported by Clyde Hansen who worked on 
the original pipeline. He agreed that Mullinix's proposal of a second bubbler, Ex. 51, was 
compatible with the existing pipeline and would allow greater amounts of water to be 
placed in the pipe. Tr., p. 347, L. 20, p. 348, L. 19. The Court found this to be the most 
"sensible" design. 
In short, the fact is that is quite possible and indeed, "sensible," to have two points 
of diversion into the same pipe. Killgore's general citations to the case law of waiver, 
laches and estoppel have no bearing on the facts of this case and cannot overcome the 
clear and unambiguous language of the agreement. 
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K. The District Court Properly Applied Article XV Section 4 of the 
Idaho Constitution and I.C. 42-101. 
In this section of the brief, Killgore begins with the premise ( contrary to all the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and contrary to the documentary history of the 
water rights) that Mullinix had no "prior right" to use the ditch, pipeline or right of way. 
Once that premise is gone, Killgore's argument fades away. There is no question that 
water was put to beneficial use upon the Mullinix property from Joe Creek through the 
old ditch. Killgore admits it. The records before IDWR show large discrepancies in 
Killgore's testimony, but the evidence substantially supports the conclusion that the 
Killgore 130 acres, including the Mullinix parcel, had been irrigated from Joe Creek and 
the earthen ditch. The Department so concluded. The SRBA court decreed a water right 
on the Mullinix parcel which establishes that irrigation took place at least as of the 
commencement of the adjudication. While Killgore denies this is true, the court has ruled 
otherwise. 
Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
Section 4. Continuing rights to water guaranteed. Whenever any waters have 
been, or shall be, appropriated or used for agricultural purposes, under a sale, 
rental, or distribution thereof, such sale, rental, or distribution shall be deemed an 
exclusive dedication to such use; and whenever such waters so dedicated shall 
have once been sold, rented or distributed to any person who has settled upon or 
improved land for agricultural purposes with the view of receiving the benefit of 
such water under such dedication, such person, his heirs, executors, 
administrators, successors, or assigns, shall not thereafter, without his consent, be 
deprived of the annual use of the same, when needed for domestic purposes, or to 
irrigate the land so settled upon or improved, upon payment therefor, and 
compliance with such equitable terms and conditions as to the quantity used and 
times of use, as may be prescribed by law. 
Similarly, Idaho Code§ 42-101, in pertinent provides: 
the right to the use of any of the public waters which have heretofore been 
or may hereafter be allotted or beneficially applied, shall not be considered 
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as being a property right in itself, but such right shall become the 
complement of, or one of the appurtenances of, the land or other thing to 
which, through necessity, said water is being applied; and the right to 
continue the use of any such water shall never be denied or prevented 
from any other cause than the failure on the part of the user thereof to pay 
the ordinary charges or assessments which may be made to cover the 
expenses for the delivery of such water. 
The court correctly recognized the concept of dedication of the water right to the 
land. The court also correctly concluded that Mullinix were the successors in interest to a 
portion of the parent water right appropriated and held by James and Josephine Killgore 
for use on lands which included the Mullinix parcel, and were likewise a successor in 
interest to the land. See R. 229. As such, Article XV, Section 4 of the Idaho Constitution 
and Idaho Code§ 42-101 provide for the continuing rights to water on this land and the 
accompanying rights thereto. 
L. Idaho Code § 42-912 Applies to Killgore 
Killgore argues that the district court erred in applying Idaho Code§ 42-912 
contending that 1) this code section does not apply to them, but only applies to irrigation 
districts and canal companies; that 2) the Killgore water right is not for sale or rental; that 
3) Idaho Code§ 42-912 does not require Killgore to furnish water for which it does not 
hold title; and that 4) Idaho Code§ 42-912 only applies to for-profit entities. Killgore 
argues that Killgore is a mere property owner that developed its own water rights for 
irrigation of its own lands over 50 years ago (and of course for Mullinix's land as well). 
Therefore, in Killgore's way of thinking, the Court should ignore the fact that Killgore 
has since subdivided and sold off most of its land, retained the water rights and 
conveyance system. Killgore would also have the court ignore the fact that Killgore now 
requires any lot purchasers who wishes to receive any water at all from Killgore to pay 
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hook up and annual fees and enter into an irrigation agreement for the use and 
distribution of water. 
The district court made the following findings based upon the evidence: 
Killgore has superior title to a 2.2 cubic feet per second water right on Joe 
Creek (water right No. 79-14233) for irrigation. Killgore own and controls 
an irrigation works (the existing pipeline and diversion works) that crosses 
the Mullinix parcel and continues to the east to property within various 
phases ofK.illgore's Horseshoe Bend Estates subdivision. Killgore uses 
the irrigation works for the distribution of a portion of Killgore' s Joe 
Creek water right under a sale or rental to certain lot owners in K.illgore's 
Horseshoe Bend Estates subdivisions pursuant to written irrigation 
agreements with those owners. Killgore has not contracted to deliver its 
entire 2.2 cubic feet per second water right on Joe Creek. Killgore appears 
to have sufficient water from Joe Creek under water right number 
79-14233 to provide 0.4 cubic feet per second of water to the Mullinix 
parcel. 
R. 230 1 8. Killgore does not contend that the facts are not supported by substantial, 
competent evidence. The court also determined that Mullinix made a property demand 
and tendered security. R.23019. Killgore does not challenge that finding. See Exs. 37 
&42. 
Killgore entered into Irrigation Easements with some of the Horseshoe Bend 
subdivision lot owners. Those agreements state that Killgore owns the water rights and 
the conveyance system, not the lot owners. Ex. 33 & 33A-G. These Irrigation 
Agreements expressly state that Killgore is "the owner of certain irrigation water 
rights ... and is the owner of all irrigation transmission lines ... (and that it) wishes to share 
the irrigation water and use of the irrigation transmission lines with certain purchasers of 
said parcel..." for a hook-up and maintenance fee. The agreements also provide that 
Killgore could lien the lot owners' property and cut off the irrigation water supply for 
lack of payment. Ex. 33A-G. "If they don't pay, they don't get it." Tr., p. 385, L. 10. In 
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addition, these agreements limit the amount of land to be irrigated at less than the full 
size of the parcel purchased (typically only one-half or one acre). Id 
Certain Horseshoe Bend subdivision lot owners attempted to transfer the Joe 
Creek water rights to their own names. Killgore objected to IDWR on the grounds that 
the Joe Creek right was retained by Killgore. Ex. 22; Tr., p. 584, L. 24, p. 585, L. 3. 
Killgore also advised the Department that if the lot owners opted out they could not later 
opt back in. Ex. 23, p.3. As a result, the transfer applications were denied. Id. 
Killgore developed and sold most of its original parcel to third parties in the 
Horseshoe Bend subdivision. Killgore retained the water rights. Killgore maintains and 
controls the irrigation works, and provides water under contracts for a fee-which is 
exactly what Idaho Code§ 42-912 contemplates. Killgore sounds exactly like a water 
delivery entity. If Killgore was not originally subject to Idaho Code§ 42-912, it certainly 
is now. This is not about the court "magically" transforming Killgore as claimed. The 
transformation to a water delivery entity was entirely ofKillgore's own doing. 
Killgore's main argument rests on its claim that it is not a canal company or 
irrigation district. Therefore, Killgore contends it is exempt from Idaho Code§ 42-912. 
Mullinix agrees that Idaho Code§ 42-912 applies to irrigation district and canal 
companies. However, that does not end the inquiry. 
Idaho Code§ 42-912 applies to "any person or company", and not just a canal 
company or irrigation district or a company that was originally established as a canal 
company. Therefore, it is irrelevant that Killgore was not incorporated as a canal 
company or that it previously irrigated its land for agricultural purposes, or that it was 
incorporated as a fruit company. In fact, Killgore's orchards were ripped out in the 1980s 
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or 1990s and all the trees removed. Tr., p. 363, LL. 9-23. Of the parties, only Mullinix 
maintains an orchard today. Tr., p. 169, LL. 20-25. Since the statute on its face is not 
limited to canal companies or irrigation districts, the Court should reject Killgore's 
strained argument. 
Next Killgore asserts there has been no sale or rental of water to users. Killgore 
does not dispute the Court's finding that they charge a fee to use the water. Indeed they 
could not. Ex. 33A-G. If the landowner doesn't pay the fee, as Carl Killgore testified, 
they are shut off. Tr., p. 385, L. 10. Black's defines "rental" as "payment received 
periodically for the use of property; rent." Black's Law Dictionary, (4th Ed). Periodic 
payments are required for the use of property (water) here. Clearly it is a "rental". 
Killgore argues that the rental fee is just to cover expenses and is not for profit, 
and that somehow excludes their arrangement. Appellate's Briefp. 32. The problem with 
that line of reasoning is that canal companies are non-profit entities which have the right 
to levy assessments to cover operating costs. Idaho Code, § 42-2201. Irrigation Districts 
are quasi-governmental entities which assess landowners based on the cost of operation 
and maintenance. Idaho Code § 43-701. Neither are for-profit entities. Accepting the 
proposed Killgore exemption from Idaho Code§ 42-912 eliminates the very entities that 
Killgore agrees are subject to that code section. This argument lacks any merit. 
Then Killgore ignores the plain language of the statute and the ruling of the 
District Court. The court did not order Killgore to furnish water for which it does not 
hold title. Idaho Code § 42-912 states in pertinent part, "no person, company or 
corporation shall contract to deliver more water than ... [it] has a title to." 
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In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the District Court finds: 
Killgore has not contracted to deliver its entire 2.2 cubic feet per second 
water right on Joe Creeks. Killgore appears to have sufficient remaining 
water from Joe Creek under water right No. 79-14233 to provide 0.4 cubic 
feet per second of water to the Mullinix parcel. 
R. 230, ,r 8. The court further states that, "[i]f meters are placed on the water delivery 
system and the flows of water through that system fall below 2.6 cubic feet per second, 
Mullinix's right to 0.4 cubic feet per second would correspondingly decrease, and to the 
extent the flow declined to 2.2 cubic feet per second or less, Mullinix's right to water 
would terminate until such time that the flow exceeded 2.2 cubic feet per second." It does 
not state or order that Killgore is obligated to pump Mullinix's water. 
If Killgore is diverting 2.6 cfs through the pipe it is illegally diverting water 
beyond its decreed right of 2.2 cfs. Because Mullinix has an interest in the ditch or 
pipeline, the court is ordering that he has a right to this water, beyond the 2.2 cfs. 
M. The District Court Correctly Held That Killgore Tortiously Injured 
Mullinix 
The District Court found that Mullinix had a right in the ditch, or pipeline, and 
therefore has a right to connect to the pipeline where it crosses his property. R. 228-229. 
Because of that interest, Killgore had no right to disconnect Mullinix. In doing so, they 
damaged his property. Killgore's argument on appeal is premised upon Mullinix not 
having any right to the ditch or pipeline-and accordingly fails along with the rest of 
Killgore' s appeal. Killgore also failed to show how Mullinix' s connections on his own 
property injured them. 
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N. The District Court Correctly Concluded that Mullinix was the 
Prevailing Party 
Killgore's argument concerning the prevailing party rests entirely upon a 
complete reversal by this Court. Based upon the evidence before the district court, and 
the court's decree-Mullinix clearly was the prevailing party below. 
0. Killgore's Use of Water from Joe Creek is Limited to Beneficial Use 
and the Rate of One-inch per Acre. 
The district court's Decree, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law provide that 
as water flows in Joe Creek declined below 2.6 cfs, that Mullinix right would decline 
proportionately. R. 233. The decree is potentially subject to an interpretation that this 
decline in Mullinix's right must take place regardless ofKillgore's beneficial use. 
R. 240. This concern is the subject of the pending motion to reconsider. Id. Here, the 
district court retained jurisdiction over future disputes because it concluded that future 
disputes were likely. R. 234, ,r 4. 
Mullinix requests that this Court in its written opinion provide guidance to the 
district court for future disputes on the issue of beneficial use of the parties' water rights. 
While the district court understandably engaged in a numbers exercise, as this Court 
knows the quantity element of the water right is the upper end of the right to use. "The 
concept that beneficial use acts as a measure and limit upon the extent of a water right is 
a consistent theme in Idaho water law." In re Distribution of Water, 155 Idaho 640,650, 
315 P.3d 828, 838 (2013). 
Killgore only irrigated about 40 acres of its land, within the place of use. Tr., 
p. 401, LL. 18-19. Or perhaps the acreage is only 35 acres. Tr., p. 488, LL. 13-18. Only 
twelve lot owners signed up and six water users paid the fees to use water on only one-
half or one acre each. Ex. 33, Tr., p. 592, LL. 6-24. That is less than one-half of the 110 
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acres authorized under Killgore' s right. This lack of land to where water is put to 
beneficial use raises the question of the scope of the injunction and the ability of Killgore 
to shut Mullinix down when water in Joe Creek declines. Mullinix respectfully requests 
this court to make it clear that Killgore's right to use Joe Creek water is limited to 
beneficial use on land in the place of use. 
V. MULLINIX IS ENTITLED TO COSTS AND FEES ON APPEAL 
Killgore's appeal is predicated in large part on challenging the district court's 
findings of fact, but at the same time refusing to acknowledge the facts in the record to 
support the decision. Killgore also extensively argues the factual issue of alleged non-use 
of water on the Mullinix property, despite the Killgore's repeated assertions under oath to 
the contrary, and despite the SRBA court's fmding determination that water was used on 
the property. Many ofKillgore's main arguments are completely unsupported by any 
citation of authority. 
The best that can be said is that Killgore is asking this Court to second guess both 
the findings and the district court's exercise of discretion in granting the injunctive relief 
ordered. Under those circumstances, this Court has held that attorney's fees are properly 
awarded to the respondent on appeal. Lower Payette Ditch Company v. Harvey, 152 
Idaho 291,297, 271 P.3d 689,695 (2012); Kelley v. Yaden, 150 Idaho 334,338,247 P.3d 
199,203 (2011). Hence, Mullinix requests to an award of attorney's fees and costs 
pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121, and I.A.R. 40 and 41. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 44 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Mullinix has the right to use the ditch and pipeline as determined by the district 
court. The district court's injunction on how the water is to be used was an exercise of 
discretion, taking into account Killgore's continued obstructionism after the court had 
ruled in Mullinix's favor. There has been no abuse of discretion and the Decree should 
be affirmed. 
DATED this 8th day of July, 2014. 
BARKERjlOSHOLT & SIMPSON LLP 
/ll/' -~ a/,/4~»~ 
By Albert P. Barker 
and 
J. A. WRIGHT, ISB #4403 
Attorney at Law 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counter-Defendants 
Daryl K. and Linda L. Mullinix 
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